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The Argentinian writer Jorge Luis Borges indicates in his essay ‘Time and 
J. W. Dunne’ that he does not “pretend to know what sort of thing time is—
or even if it is a ‘thing’.”1 But we can see from Borges’ writings that he has 
undoubtedly thought deeply about the subject, including questioning the 
notion that time flows from past to future via the present. For instance, 
Borges alludes to his misgivings about the arrow of time in the short story 
‘The Garden of Forking Paths’ where the protagonist, Dr Yu Tsun, 
confronts the possibility of his death. While he first finds it “incredible” 
that he is going die that day, Dr Tsun acknowledges also the pointlessness 
of mourning for our lost lives because all things happen only in the present: 
“Then I reflected that everything happens to a man … precisely now. 
Centuries of centuries and only in the present do things happen.”2 I believe, 
however, that Borges’ eclectic research and erudition in relation to the idea 
of time reaches its apotheosis in his essay ‘A New Refutation of Time’ 
where he offers his most explicit statements on the subject, especially in 
rejecting the reality of time’s flow, by accepting arguments from science, 
metaphysics, and elsewhere. 
Even so, we find that Borges appears to express a certain 
ambivalence as well about such a standpoint. In this article—after first 
discussing what led to Borges’ seeming denial of the arrow of time—I 
intend to explain why I feel Borges is unable to get reconciled to such a 
view of time without any reservations. I then argue that this is because a 
view that refutes time denies the observer too along with it. I conclude with 
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showing how Borges addresses this problem by endeavouring to identify a 
reconciliation between a refutation of time and an acknowledgment of its 
reality. 
 
Borges and the Refutation of Time 
Borges states in his ‘A New Refutation of Time’ that he denies “in an 
elevated number of instances, the successive [and] the contemporary as 
well.”3 Time, in other words, is made up of disjointed instances and every 
one of those moments is absolute and hermetic. Consequently, the person 
who thinks (for example) that his lover was deceiving him while he was 
confident of the latter’s fidelity is in fact, Borges contends, deceiving 
himself. As Borges explains, “if every state we experience is absolute, such 
happiness was not contemporary to the betrayal; the discovery of that 
betrayal is another state, which cannot modify the ‘previous’ ones.”4 
Borges then offers some examples from history to show that other human 
feelings, like hope and fear too, “seem [akin to love] no less vain [because] 
each moment is autonomous. Neither vengeance nor pardons nor prisons 
nor even oblivion can modify the invulnerable past.”5 This is more so as 
psychologists estimate the “specious present” to last only a few seconds (or 
even less) and that, Borges notes, could be the length of what we refer to as 
history.6 Hence, there is no such thing called history, as we usually 
understand it, as a progression of related events that lasts over a long time, 
across millennia. “Each moment exists, but not their imaginary 
combination [and] if time is a mental process, how can thousands of men—
or even two different men—share it?”7  
Borges makes it clear in his essay that he was influenced by the 
writings of Bishop Berkeley, David Hume and Wilhelm Gottfried Leibniz 
before he began to recognise this view of time. These writers led him 
eventually to Arthur Schopenhauer’s comparison of time “to a constantly 
revolving sphere; the half that was always sinking would be the past, that 
which was always rising would be the future; but the indivisible point at the 
top, where the tangent touches, would be the extensionless present. As the 
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tangent does not revolve with the sphere, neither does the present.”8 Hence, 
Schopenhauer holds, “[f]uture and past are only in the concept … the 
present alone is the form of life.”9 Borges adds that a Theravada Buddhist 
treatise from the fifth century, the Visuddhimagga, too, uses the example of 
a sphere to illustrate the same doctrine.10 
Another Buddhist treatise that supports these ideas and which Borges 
refers to in a footnote to ‘A New Refutation of Time’ is the Milinda Panha 
from the second century CE. The fact that Borges has cited this work in 
several of his other essays, including one dedicated to the Milinda Panha 
per se, shows how much Borges may have appreciated this work. This 
work concerns a debate between Menander (Milinda), the king of Bactria, 
and the monk Nagasena about the nature of existence and the ontology of 
the self. Nagasena’s allusion to the impermanence and relational nature of 
objects in this exchange supplements arguments against the flow of time 
and the existence of things across time. When during the discourse the king 
asks his name, Nagasena replies that names are mere conventions and 
offers as an analogy the king’s chariot which is designated by neither its 
wheels nor its chassis (or any other part);11“neither is” as Borges 
transcribes, “man, his matter, form, impressions, ideas, instincts or 
consciousness. He is not the combination of these parts nor does he exist 
outside of them.”12 Hence, all objects—be they ascetic, king, chariot or 
time—are defined purely by their relation to one another.  
W. H. Bossart does not find it difficult to see how Borges arrived at 
his refutation of time particularly when we combine Hume’s empiricism, 
Buddhist nominalism and Leibniz’s metaphysics.13 The idea that each 
moment is absolute, especially, has its antecedents in Leibniz’s ontological 
principle of the identity of indiscernibles which holds that no two objects 
share exactly the same properties. In Leibniz’s view, events therefore 
(Bossart notes) “enjoy a spatio-temporal position only through their 
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relations to other events” and time is not absolute but constructed out of the 
relation between events.14 
While echoing some elements of Leibniz’s indiscernibles, Immanuel 
Kant casts doubts even on the ontology of time and the spatio-temporal 
position Leibniz attributed to it. Kant held that space and time are a priori 
forms, modifications of the mind.15 In this view of Kant’s, as Bossart 
explains, there can be no distinction in time between one moment from 
another.16 Bossart opines that this further suggested to Kant that “although 
they are empirically real by virtue of the fact that we must impose them 
upon the data of experience, space and time are also metaphysically 
unreal.”17 This is a view that appeals to Borges in his arguments against the 
metaphysical reality of time.18 This led Borges to conclude, Bossart 
observes, that “there can be no such things as contemporaneity or 
succession … Nor does the recurring memory of one and the same thing … 
testify to the flow of time.”19  
There is support for the doubts that Borges held about the reality of 
time also in more contemporary thinkers, including philosophers and 
scientists. As a corollary to Leibniz’s and Kant’s thoughts about space and 
time, John Earman and John D. Norton wondered if space and time existed 
independently or whether they are simply an artificial mechanism to 
describe the relationship of physical objects and events. As Norton wrote, 
“Are they like a canvas onto which an artist paints; they exist whether or 
not the artist paints on them? Or are they akin to parenthood; there is no 
parenthood until there are parents and children.”20 For Leibniz, as we saw 
earlier, time was not such an “empty canvas” while for Kant that canvas 
appeared to possess a contingent reality. These questions were no doubt 
triggered by Einstein’s discoveries in the early 1900s and his thoughts on 
the “relativity of simultaneity” lend support to Borges’ questioning the 
reality of the succession of events and time’s flow. 
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Albert Einstein’s theories were closely associated with a model of 
space-time conceived by his former teacher Hermann Minkowski who in 
1908 posited that based on his views “space by itself and time by itself … 
are doomed to fade away into mere shadows, and only a kind of union of 
the two will preserve an independent reality.”21 In a more recent echo of 
these ideas (and Kant’s conclusion), some scientists have argued that 
psychological time could merely be a question of perspective. For instance, 
the theoretical physicist Carlo Rovelli contends22 that felt time arises as a 
relation between entropy and uncertainty. Rovelli observes that we 
associate the increase of entropy in what he calls “thermal time”—a 
variable that measures the flow of entropy—with the occurrence of things 
and call it “time” and “the growth of entropy distinguishes the past from 
the future for us and leads to the unfolding of the cosmos.”23 
  
“And yet, and yet…”: Borges’ Ambivalence 
As much as Borges arrived at his ideas regarding time “via the dialectics of 
Berkeley and Hume,”24 he is also aware that they “both affirm[ed] the 
existence of time”; but there was a difference in how they did it. For 
Berkeley time represented “a succession of ideas in my mind, which flows 
uniformly and is participated by all beings.”25 Moreover, Berkeley held, 
even if none of us existed and did not witness the continued presence of 
objects, God would affirm their existence.26 Hume, however, refuted the 
identity of persons and the nature of time as Berkeley saw it. As for Hume, 
the empiricist, a person was no more than a collection of perceptions and 
experiences and time too was “a succession of indivisible moments.”27  
The Berkeleyan inference that “we cannot posit the reality of the 
material world beyond the representation we have of it in our minds” is 
also posited by Borges, according to William Egginton, to deny such 
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existence beyond the present.28 The irony implicit in this approach is that, 
as Egginton points out, “its very performance requires its refutation. There 
can be no perception at all, of anything, much less arguments made about 
perceptions, without time, without extension.”29 Furthermore, if per Hume 
all our knowledge emanates solely from experience “without recourse to a 
level transcending experience,” Egginton explains, the very idea of 
experience would vanish, as we would be unable to meld the various 
moments in time to arrive at a coherent picture of the world.30 This is the 
dilemma that Borges’ Funes the Memorious faces, Egginton tells us. Funes 
has lost, after an accident, the ability to forget and he “alone [has] more 
memories than all mankind has probably had” and as a result his memory is 
“like a garbage heap.”31 Because of this, Funes lacks the facility to 
synthesise his moments in time into a whole meaningful experience.  
Consequently, a refutation of time becomes arguable; for perception 
takes place in time and knowledge is acquired over a duration of time. 
Borges is well conscious of this predicament. As he writes in the ‘prologue’ 
the title of his essay ‘A New Refutation of Time’ is “an example of the 
monster termed … contradictio in adjecto, because stating that a refutation 
is new (or old) attributes to it a predicate of temporal nature which 
establishes the very notion the subject would destroy.”32 Furthermore, these 
dialectical lacunae that ignore our shared moments and enduring histories 
may lead one to doubt not only time’s flow but even the reality of all 
objects. Thus, Borges wonders (in the voice of the narrator in ‘The Aleph’) 
if he really set eyes on the Aleph in Daneri’s cellar and so refuses to talk 
about it any further.33 For, if Hume denied the continued existence of 
objects and held that a person was not more than “a bundle of … different 
perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity,”34 
was the Aleph too just another idea with no tangible foundation?  
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But how can we refute the existence of time and physical reality 
when we witness time’s depredations in our lives every day (which is part 
of Funes’ predicament)? Funes is on the one hand imprisoned in the 
present. But he has too the inexorable awareness that he is subject to the 
eddies and whirlpools of the river of time. As Borges observes with such 
impeccable perspicacity, Funes could not help continuously “discern[ing] 
the tranquil advances of corruption, of decay, of fatigue [and] the progress 
of death, of dampness.”35 The wish (arising from this cognizance) for time 
to desist ravaging us—akin to imploring “time must have a stop” (as 
Shakespeare’s Hotspur does)—is unwittingly paradoxical. This is because 
while we yearn for each moment to form part of a stream that enriches our 
lives, we are longing too for immortality and eternity, where the one 
moment contains all past moments. This is a view of time that is epitomised 
in the description of the Aleph as “one of the points in space that contains 
all points [and one] where … all the places of the world, scene from every 
angle, coexist.”36 The irony here is that time will ultimately devour us. But 
we, like an ouroboros, also consume time before it does so. 
As Borges writes, “[a]nd yet, and yet … Denying temporal 
succession, denying the self, denying the astronomical universe, are 
apparent desperations and secret consolations. Our destiny … is not 
frightful by being unreal; it is frightful because it is irreversible and iron-
clad.”37 Borges then appends to this acceptance of life’s realities the 
following Delphic pronouncement about this enigma called time (and how 
it shapes the equally enigmatic concept of the self): 
Time is the substance I am made of. Time is a river which sweeps 
me along, but I am the river; it is a tiger which destroys me, but I am 
the tiger; it is a fire which consumes me, but I am the fire. The 
world, unfortunately, is real; I, unfortunately, am Borges. 
Borges’ visualising of time as being the river that sweeps him along—while 
he himself is the river—is reminiscent of Baruch Spinoza’s view of reality 
which Bossart thinks is “central to Borges’ preoccupations.”38  
For Spinoza, as Bossart elucidates, nature unfolds “within the 
continual flux of time.”39 While science tries to identify the “efficient 
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causes” of events, that quest is necessarily tentative and incomplete 
because we can never go back to the first moment in time. Consequently, 
Bossart concludes,  
[i]nsofar as I see myself as immersed in the river of time, I can never 
know who I am, for I am as myriad a being as the circumstances 
which are involved in my formation. Seen under the aspect of 
eternity, however … what I call myself is nothing more than a 
particular aspect of the modal series which flows logically and 
eternally from God’s nature.40  
This, I believe, is the most salient element of Bossart’s linking of Borges’ 
view of time and Spinoza’s metaphysics. Bossart then adds that Spinoza 
too used the metaphor of the river to describe time. In his view, Spinoza’s 
wondering “What weft or scheme is this, what river is this whose face is 
inconceivable” seems to reaffirm our being caught in time’s eddy.41 But, 
“there is also the suggestion [per] Spinoza,” Bossart adds, “that although I 
am carried away by this river I nevertheless am this river. In short, I am made 
from an unstable material, time … and perhaps its source lies in me.”42 
We cannot overlook either the Heraclitan element in this comparison 
of time to a river: namely, change. But a view that denies time—or at the 
least time’s flux—portrays a world without love, a space sans poetry. As 
Borges put it, by holding that reality consists of only one unchanging 
substance, Parmenides made “the universe an idle adjective of the 
Absolute.”43 In this Borges reflects a very human vexation with the 
emptiness that a timeless universe portends. In a similar vein, a view of 
science that upholds static time too reifies such a Parmenidean perspective.  
This becomes apparent when we consider the thoughts of some 
scientists who hold that space-time, let alone being static, may even be 
merely conjectural. This belief lends support to the prophecy by 
Minkowski who, as we saw earlier, thought that space and time “are 
doomed to fade away into mere shadows.” As per this view, no meaning 
could be attributed to space-time before the Big Bang as the universe at that 
juncture had not split into various objects. The expansion of the universe 
after the Big Bang then allowed objects to derive meaning. “It is 
nevertheless,” as Geoffrey Chew from University of California Berkeley 
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contends, “only an approximation to attribute ‘identity’ to any piece of the 
universe—to any ‘object’ (including a human being).”44 
As the theoretical physicist and Nobel laureate Frank Wilczek found, 
there is therefore an ongoing 
tension between the God’s-eye view of reality comprehended as a 
whole and the ant’s-eye view of human consciousness, which senses 
a succession of events in time. Since the days of Isaac Newton, the 
ant’s-eye view has dominated fundamental physics. [But we] divide 
our description of the world into dynamical laws that, paradoxically, 
exist outside of time.45  
Hence, while natural laws may be “dynamical” this “God’s-eye view of 
reality” is overall a rather static one where space-time simply is and 
wherein “nothing happens; nothing changes,” as Robert Geroch states.46 
Particles do not, in other words, move through space-time or follow an 
identifiable history across time.  
However, such a vision of the universe—which attributes a static 
nature to space and time—makes sense only for someone (such as God) 
who can stand outside that domain. But us mortals live inside that 
universe—not outside—and are subject to rules over which we have 
seemingly little control. This is the essential difference between how time 
is perceived by everyday humans and how time is defined by those who 
deny its reality. Consequently, science’s contention that we live in a 
timeless universe is not always easily explained in everyday language, as a 
notion of time is so much part of our everyday lives. As another Nobel-
prize winning physicist Erwin Schrodinger underscores, when science tries 
to explain a sequence of events and their cause-and-effect relationship 
without referring to time, “it … is not … easily explained in non-
mathematical language. Not that the mathematical scheme is so 
complicated. But everyday language is prejudicial in that it is so thoroughly 
imbued with the notion of time.”47 Borges too appears resigned to the 
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inescapability of time as we understand it and feel it—something that 
becomes more apparent when we also account for the limits to human 
reasoning and knowledge. Hence, in his prologue to ‘A New Refutation of 
Time’ he confesses that the essay is “the feeble artifice of an Argentinian 
lost in the maze of metaphysics.”48  
Borges avers elsewhere that he is “neither a thinker nor a moralist, 
but simply a man of letters who turns his own perplexities and that 
respected system of perplexities we call philosophy into the forms of 
literature.”49 I would argue that these observations of Borges’—which John 
Sturrock from the Times Literary Supplement described as “mock 
modesty”50—also subsume a discontent with an approach to understanding 
that reduces the world merely into atoms, particles and objects. He 
recognises here the need to accept human limitations that apply not only to 
“an Argentinian” but all of us.  
In this respect, we are like the leopard (in Borges’ ‘Inferno, I, 32’) 
who expresses “an obscure resignation, a valorous ignorance, for the 
machinery of the world is much too complex for the simplicity of a 
beast.”51 But in case we rejoice that such inadequacies apply only to other 
animals, Borges reiterates that it applies to us humans, too, by adding that 
even Dante who placed the “figure and symbol” of the leopard in a poem 
may have “received and lost an infinite thing, something he would not be 
able to recuperate or even glimpse, for the machinery of the world is much 
too complex for the simplicity of man.”52 Borges’ appreciation of our 
deficiencies is evident yet again in the quote from Leviathan by Thomas 
Hobbes that he uses as an epigraph to ‘The Aleph’: “But they will teach us 
that Eternity is the Standing still of the Present Time … which neither they, 
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52 Borges, Labyrinths, p. 273. 
53 Borges, The Aleph, p. 118. 
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Time and the Observer 
“And yet, and yet…” (to borrow Borges’ inimitable conjunction) we feel 
the urge nevertheless—despite being assailed by doubts and confusions—to 
find meaning in our lives and seek fulfilment. In exhibiting this desire, we 
resemble the leopard in Borges’ ‘Inferno’ to whom God spoke thus in a 
dream: “You suffer captivity, but you will have given a word to the 
poem.”54 To understand why this is so, we have to start with the admission 
that any inquiry into time will lead us inevitably to the difference between 
time in science (or what Bossart calls “world or public time”)55 and 
psychological time, time that courses through our minds. “[T]he clearest 
treatment of [this] distinction,” as Bossart opines, is to be found in Borges’ 
short story, ‘The Secret Miracle’.56 In this tale, the prisoner Hladik who is 
condemned to death prays to God to grant him a year needed to complete 
his play. He seemingly lives through this one year while being executed 
(which takes only two minutes) when time apparently freezes for him.57 
Which time was more ‘real’ for Hladik? The two minutes of clock time 
(which physics claims is at best illusory) or felt time, time relative to the 
individual? Such an enquiry underlines the need (in our efforts to define 
time) to include the observer—the one who perceives, the one who 
experiences. 
We saw earlier how Borges based his “refutation” of time on the 
ideas of Bishop Berkeley and other thinkers and how his viewpoint is 
supported also by certain scientists. Even so, when these dialectics are seen 
through the prism of the observer, we realise that a hasty repudiation of the 
reality of time may be founded on quicksand. The arguments supporting 
this conclusion can be divided largely into two points of view: the 
metaphysical (or philosophical), and the scientific (although some overlap 
between them is unavoidable). 
 
Time and the Observer in Metaphysics/Philosophy 
Psychological time refers to our sense that events have a duration, a pattern 
of succession or simultaneity. An understanding that time passes from past 
to future via the present assigns structure to our memories, the bedrock of 
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our conceptions of a self. In Felt Time: The Psychology of How We 
Perceive Time, the German psychologist and researcher Marc Wittman 
explains how we use working memory to form and sustain a notion of self. 
Although we perceive life in a series of “nows” working memory “forms 
the temporal bridge between individual moments of lived experience and 
gives rise to the feeling that [the] ego exists continuously in the world.”58 
Our awareness of the flow of time is (like a movie made up of several 
individual frames) underpinned by interlinked memories. The idea of an 
enduring self is facilitated by the interaction of memory and our linguistic 
capacities which enable us to connect events into a coherent narrative about 
who we are. But these stories take time to develop, Wittman points out,59 
and hence the need to think of experience as consisting of a duration, not 
just discrete instants.60  
Berkeley, on whom Borges depended for the disavowal of time’s 
reality, acknowledges none the less the significance of the observer (who 
possesses and processes these memories). In his language, the observer 
takes on the guise of a “mind.” Without that mind, things would not exist. 
Their esse is percipi, in Berkeley’s well-known dictum: to exist is to be 
perceived (and hence the presupposition of a perceiver). “All the choir of 
heaven and furniture of the earth … have not any substance without a mind, 
that their being is to be perceived or known,”61 says Borges. If an opponent 
argued that things could be imagined to exist on their own without positing 
a consciousness to do that imagination, Berkeley would have responded by 
holding that even if humans were not the imaginers such things have to 
“subsist in the mind of some eternal spirit,” or “they must have no 
existence at all.”62 
The observer not only perceives; the observer also brings order to 
what is perceived and mines meaning from experience by sieving it through 
time. As Kant contended, “all of our cognitions are in the end subjected to 
the formal condition of inner sense, namely time, as that in which they 
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must all be ordered, connected.”63 Without such a synthesis, Egginton 
points out, the various components of experience would be “apprehended 
[only] in their individual unity,” which is the problem Borges’ Funes the 
Memorious faced, and, paradoxically, “the manifold of space and time in 
which they are apprehended and separated would itself never be 
apprehended.”64 Hence a recognition by Kant that space and time—as 
much as he felt that they were “metaphysically unreal”65—were 
“fundamental to our perception of thinking about the universe,” as 
Egginton adds.66 
 
Time and the Observer: Lacunae and Assertions in Science 
Modern scientific methodology generally follows Galileo’s distinction 
between primary and secondary qualities of material bodies in trying to 
explain nature. Galileo identified67 properties such as size, shape and 
position as primary (that is, they existed in the bodies themselves) while he 
considered other properties (like colours and odours) as secondary. This 
approach has its practical benefits as it fits in with the other scientific 
dictum of assuming “other things remain constant” that simplifies 
assumptions and eases the explanatory process. 
Science views these so-called secondary qualities moreover as—as 
Richard Healey, professor of philosophy of science and metaphysics at the 
University of Arizona, explains—“a humanly convenient way of 
categorizing those things in response to fundamental properties such as the 
wavelengths of light and sound.”68 The irony here is that just as a focus on 
primary qualities may be a useful tool in science, it is the so-called 
secondary qualities that facilitate our day to day comprehension of the 
world. But “how is the human practice [for instance] of making what we 
call colour discrimination possible if colour is not a fundamental property 
of physical objects?” as Healey wonders. An account that denies that a 
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property like colour is fundamental “owes us at least a sketch of an answer 
to this question,” Healey feels. “And any such account that entails that the 
question is unanswerable is ipso facto unacceptable.”69 
In order, furthermore, to circumvent the problem posed by the 
baggage of time (felt time, that is) that comes with the observer, “the 
Parmenidean [in science] embarks,” as Healey puts it, “on an ambitious 
reconstruction project [for] coming up with serviceable replacements for 
these temporal concepts which presuppose the existence of time and change 
at a fundamental level.”70 But this process relies still on someone observing 
nature and coming to conclusions. To support its hypotheses, science is so 
dependent on empirical evidence, an analysis of events that reflect 
change—and observers, because change is perceived in the mind of the 
observer. Hence, there is no science without observers—or time.  
Even if we chose to ignore the human realities associated with 
observers, there is no getting around the paradox inherent in the scientific 
process itself: while its ultimate conclusions hearken a Parmenidean ennui 
or stasis, the process of scientific discovery itself is inescapably embedded 
in a temporal paradigm.	As Healey explains, the nature of observations and 
experiments is that they give rise to experiences in the scientists who 
perform them. These experiences are events that take place in time, and 
the testing … presupposes the possibility of change—in the mental 
state of an observer [and] also in the physical state of the world … 
Put bluntly, a radically timeless interpretation of [say] general 
relativity entails the impossibility of performing any of the 
experiments and observations … Such an interpretation makes the 
theory empirically self-refuting [and we would have] no good reason 
to deny the existence of time as a fundamental feature of reality.71 
In a recognition of these issues, some prominent scientists—such as John 
Wheeler and Roger Penrose—have stressed the importance of 
incorporating the observer in science’s explication of phenomena. Wheeler 
asserted in fact that “No elementary phenomenon is a phenomenon until it 
is an observed phenomenon.”72  
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Wheeler was also one of the first leading scientists to accept—as the 
science writer John Horgan points out—that “reality might not be wholly 
physical; in some sense, our cosmos must be a ‘participatory’ phenomenon 
requiring the act of observation—and thus consciousness itself.”73 As for 
consciousness, Penrose has argued (as Egginton tells us) indeed that 
“conscious observation plays a pivotal role in quantum mechanics, and that, 
vice versa, quantum mechanics are somehow responsible for the experience 
of consciousness.”74 These arguments lead us to surmise that whatever 
objective reality may be—even if there is another reality behind and apart 
from the one we perceive—the only reality that matters, the only reality 
that influences sentient lives, is the one we observers perceive (and this 
reality ineluctably includes time). 
 
Borges’ Search for a Reconciliation 
Borges begins his ‘first article’ of ‘A New Refutation of Time’ thus: “In the 
course of a life dedicated to letters and … to metaphysical perplexity, I 
have glimpsed or foreseen a refutation of time, in which I myself do not 
believe, but which regularly visits me at night and in weary twilight with 
the illusory force of an axiom.”75 For W. H. Bossart “the coupling of 
‘illusory force’ with ‘axiom’ suggests … that there are no self-evident 
truths but only conventional ones.”76 This is exemplified in Borges’ 
‘Averroes’ Search’ whose core idea “is that there is no context neutral 
standpoint from which one can consider the data of experience 
“‘objectively’.” Rather all description and explanation take place within a 
particular context or from a particular point of view” as Bossart asserts.77 
The metaphysical questions that Borges examines are consequently, as the 
literary critic Jaime Alazraki tells us, to be “understood not as attempts to 
comprehend or interpret the historical universe, but rather as schemes of a 
world [in Borges’ words] ‘constructed by means of logic, with little or no 
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appeal to concrete experience’.”78 Idealism can thus be held up as a mirror 
for science to look into and realise its own limitations. 
Borges also wrote elsewhere that he “thought above all of the literary 
possibilities of Idealist philosophy, let’s say, rather than its intrinsic merits 
… This does not necessarily mean that I believe in the philosophy of 
Berkeley or Schopenhauer … I believe I was thinking rather of the alchemy 
or unreality of the material world as subjects usable by literature.”79 “Thus 
Borges is an Idealist,” as Sturrock points out, “only when he writes … The 
ideas of Berkeley and Schopenhauer [are] to play with, not ones to live 
by.”80 But while choosing to focus on the literary potentials of philosophy, 
Borges retains none the less, as Alazraki emphasises, a “yearning for an 
order that is unattainable to human intelligence.”81 This theme is shared, 
Alazraki adds, by Borges’ poems, short stories and essays. As Alazraki 
cites from Borges’ ‘The Analytical Language of John Wilkins’, “the 
impossibility of penetrating the divine scheme of the universe cannot 
dissuade us from outlining human schemes, even though we are aware that 
they are provisional.”82 
These affirmations by Borges (and as elucidated by a number of 
critics) tell us that Borges acknowledged the need to take a denial of time 
with a certain amount of scepticism and identify therefore a modus vivendi 
that threads a path between the non-existence of time as asserted in physics 
and the undeniable reality of time in the mind of an observer. One of the 
first steps Borges perhaps took to fulfil this objective was to interweave an 
awareness of the limits of human intelligence and knowledge in his 
writings. We have an excellent illustration of this idea in Borges’ ‘The 
Library of Babel’ which Marcelo Gleiser thinks is “a metaphorical replica 
of the universe”83 including allusions to the shortcomings of current 
cosmological thinking. What’s more, if the library represents the universe, 
it contains everything—including the reader and the narrator. It is therefore 
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not possible for someone—one with only an ant’s eye view of the world, as 
we saw earlier, to stand “outside” this universe and examine it, let alone 
explain it. As Gleiser puts it: “Like a fish that wants to understand the 
totality of the oceans, the librarians try in vain to decipher the mysteries of 
their world, unaware that all they can acquire is a partial knowledge of 
reality.”84 Hence, complete knowledge is unattainable. 
Our language is circumscribed by its past as well. Hence, we employ 
metaphors, symbolisms and other linguistic devices to create meaning: 
“Every language is an alphabet of labels the employment of which assumes 
a past shared by its interlocutors. How can I transmit to others the infinite 
Aleph, which my timorous memory can scarcely contain? In a similar 
situation, mystics have employed a wealth of emblems.”85 To overcome the 
limits of language, Borges uses oxymora (an artifice akin to such 
“emblems”) not merely as stylistic devices but also as tools for revealing 
deeper levels of reality. Oxymora are where the meaning of a word is 
contradicted by another term. When wielded by Borges, they (as Alazraki 
explains) help appraise and modify a concept (idealism, for example) by 
other theories (those, for instance, that assert the reality of time) which 
contradict it. “At the same time … they restore the ideas, the subject matter 
of the essay,” Alazraki contends, “where they regain their validity, not as a 
description of the world but as marvels of human imagination.”86 An 
oxymoron thus, is an attempt to overcome the inherent narrowness that 
reason has imposed on language.  
Such an oxymoronic approach is itself a metaphor for the paradox 
that is integral to the nature of time. For Borges writing is an escape from 
the reality of time. It is “a passing distraction from reality,”87 as John 
Sturrock puts it, in which the clock has seemingly stopped. But once the 
“dream” (of writing) stops, “the clock will eventually have to be restarted 
… and [the author should] return to the real world and its insistent 
chronometry.”88 Borges is hence realistic in how he contends with time. He 
does not dream—much as science exhorts to do—“the impossible dream of 
stopping time dead” as Sturrock notes.89 Time’s flow is, in other words, 
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undeniable. Instead, Borges only “exploits, as all narrative is bound to do, 
the possibilities of postponing it.”90 
 
Conclusion 
To write these concluding words, I shall now travel back to the beginning. 
(Here, by the way, is yet another instance of the ineluctable presence of 
temporal idioms in our language). This starting point refers to an epigraph 
to Jorge Luis Borges’ essay, ‘A New Refutation of Time’ consisting of a 
quotation in German by Daniel von Czepko91 which, translated into 
English,92 proclaims that “Before me there was no time, after me there will 
be none. With me it is born, with me it will also die.” It appears to 
succinctly epitomise the notion that time may be an artefact—or a feature 
of existence explainable only through the prism of our hyper-
individuality—whose reality is commensurate only with our individual 
lifetimes.  
But, as Borges realised, this does not gainsay the actuality of “felt 
time” which underlies the pleasures and pains of human existence and 
hence his vexation with theories of time that ignore its role in human 
destinies. Consequently, Borges chose, as Alazraki points out, “to 
sublimate his impotence toward reality by creating another … man-made 
reality.”93 This is a reference to Borges’ inability to wholly embrace 
philosophical idealism. He opts instead to accept its utility as a “branch of 
fantastic literature” (as did the metaphysicians in Borges’ ‘Tlön, Uqbar, 
Orbis Tertius’).94 
The introduction to this essay included an example of how Borges 
utilised metaphysical speculation as a literary device. This is where Dr Yu 
Tsun contemplates his impending death.95 Dr Tsun’s realisation that 
everything happens in the present is not only a denial of time’s arrow but 
also the allied concept of philosophical presentism which refutes the 
ontology of both past and future. Borges refers to presentism in ‘Tlön, 
Uqbar, Orbis Tertius’ too where another set of philosophers hold the view 
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that “the present is indefinite … the future is [nothing but] a present hope 
[and] the past has no reality other than as a present memory.”96 
Another idea that Borges explores is the multiverse. When Dr Tsun’s 
manuscripts are examined after his death, we find that Dr Tsun did not 
believe in “a uniform, absolute time” but an “infinite series of time … 
divergent, convergent and parallel times. We do not exist in the majority of 
these times; in some you exist, and not I; in others I, and not you; in others, 
both of us.”97 
‘The Theme of the Traitor and the Hero’ is a story where Borges 
examines the idea of cyclical time or time as a “circular labyrinth.”98 When 
Ryan the narrator probes the history of his ancestor and Irish hero, Fergus 
Kilpatrick, he notices several “parallelisms” between the lives of Kilpatrick 
and Julius Caesar. For instance, Kilpatrick receives a warning not to attend 
the theatre where he will be subsequently murdered, much like how Caesar 
received a note prior to going to the place where the daggers awaited him. 
(This also prefigures Lincoln’s assassination at Ford’s Theatre).99 Borges 
alludes here to the notion of circularity of time, where events keep 
recurring across time. 
Lastly, we have a seamless blend of history, speculation and the 
metaphysics of time in Borges’s essay ‘The Wall and the Books’ which 
looks at a Chinese emperor’s quest for immortality. History tells us that Shi 
Huang Ti (259-210 BC) ordered the construction of the Great Wall. In his 
essay, Borges refers to this fact and the legend that Shih also decreed the 
destruction of all books created prior to his time. Borges then wonders if 
the emperor wished to restart time—especially with the burning of books 
and thus abolishing all antecedent history—and begin anew with his own. 
“Perhaps the emperor wanted to recreate the beginning of time.”100 We 
referred earlier to Hotspur’s wish for time to have a stop. Shih’s aspiration 
is an adjunct to that invocation: what the emperor covets is for time to not 
only have a momentary cessation but to then start over from the emperor’s 
reign on earth in his pursuit of “the elixir of immortality.”101 
																																								 																				
 
96 Borges, Labyrinths, p. 34. 
97 Borges, Labyrinths, p. 53. 
98 Borges, Labyrinths, p. 103. 
99 Borges, Labyrinths, pp. 103-4. 
100 Borges, Labyrinths, p. 222. 
101 Borges, Labyrinths, p. 222. 
